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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated ("UCA") § 78-2-2(3)0). Under UCA § 78-2-2(4), the Supreme Court has 
transferred the matter to the Court of Appeals, which possesses jurisdiction over matters 
so transferred pursuant to UCA § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
ISSUES 
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied the Cornabys' Motion 
to Clarify and/or Reconsider its Order of February 24, 2005, granting summary judgment 
to Appellees and denying it to the Cornabys, despite the fact that the Order is both 
unenforceable and incomplete (R. 399). 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
"A trial court's 'denial of a motion to reconsider summary judgment [is reviewed] 
under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for abuse of discretion.'" General 
Determination of the Rights to the Use of All the Water, Both Surface and Underground, 
Within the Drainage Area of Utah Lake and Jordan River in Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, 
Summit, Wasatch, Sanpete and Juab Counties in Utah, 1999 UT 39, f22, 982 P.2d 65 
(brackets in original) (quoting Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 1997) (citing Timm 
v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1386 (Utah 1996)). "A trial court's decision to grant or deny 
a motion to reconsider summary judgment 'is within the discretion of the trial court,'" 
Timm, 921 P.2d at 1386 (emphasis in original); such a decision, however, may be 
>/tfo QQQA / ) * « rrk nm nm nnn„ 2 
reversed or revisited where the trial court has abused its discretion, id. at 1386-87 (citing 
Trembly, 884 P.2d at 1312, and Gillmor v. Wright, 850 P.2d 431, 434 (Utah 1993)). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Civ. P. ("URCP"), Rules 56(c) "Summary judgment," and 60(b) "Relief 
from judgment or order." The full text of these provisions is set forth at Tab A of the 
Addendum ("Add."). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Cornabys appeal the August 31, 2005, Ruling by Judge Bryce K. Bryner (R. 
460-62 (Add., Tab C)) denying a Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider entry of summary 
judgment in favor of Plaintiffs/Appellees Radakovich,1 and against the Cornabys. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellees Radakovich brought suit against the Cornabys in May of 2002 (R. 5-9; 
Amended Complaint filed October 2003 (R. 30-35)). The parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment in June of 2004 (R. 41 & 89), and the trial court entered a final Order 
on February 24, 2005, granting summary judgment to Appellees and denying it to the 
Cornabys (R. 308-09 (Add, Tab D)). The Cornabys filed their 60(b) Motion to Clarify 
and/or Reconsider on March 14, 2005 (R. 341-42, (Memorandum in Support at pp.343-
69)), to which Appellees filed a Memorandum in Opposition on March 28, 2005 (R. 386-
1
 Appellees, Robert Radakovich and Robert Radakovich and Ellen R. Radakovich 
as Trustees of the Robert Radakovich Marital and Family Trust, are herein referred to 
collectively as either "Radakovich" or "Appellees." 
95). The Cornabys filed a Reply in Support on April 15, 2005 (R. 396-405), and the court 
heard oral argument on June 2, 2005. Thereafter, the court received supplemental 
memoranda from both parties (R. 448-57 & 421-31). On August 31, 2005, the court 
entered a Ruling denying the Cornabys' Motion (R. 460-62 {Add., Tab C)). 
The Cornabys filed their Notice of Appeal on September 28, 2005 (R. 463-65; 
Add, Tab B). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Two brothers, H.B. and Elrie Simonsen, owned as tenants in common the property 
now owned by the Cornabys and the Appellees Radakovich (R. 120 % 2 {Add., Tab G);3 
96 Tf 1; 45 \ 1). In 1955 or '56, the Simonsens agreed on a permanent physical division of 
the property (R. 121 f 3 {Add, Tab G); 97 f 2; 45 % 2). They constructed a fence and 
agreed that it would mark the division line, the land north of the fence to belong to Elrie 
Simonsen, and the land south, to H.B. Simonsen (R. 12 I f 3-4 {Add, Tab G); 97 ffif 3^1; 
45 Tflf 3-4). H.B. Simonsen was also to possess "the non-exclusive right to use the 
existing fenced right-of-way traversing the ... north parcel for entry to [and] exit from the 
The Cornabys pray the Court's indulgence for this relatively lengthy Statement of 
Fact. It should be borne in mind that the Cornabys do not challenge the trial court's 
decision, only its refusal to reconsider or clarify it. A proper understanding of the context 
and ramifications of the trial court's refusal, however, requires the methodical narration 
of the particulars set out in this Statement of Facts. 
Record pages 120-24 {Add., Tab G) are the Findings and Conclusions entered in 
Radakovich v. Simonsen (7th District, No. 9439) in January of 1969, Radakovich's first 
(unsuccessful) attempted to enlarge his estate through reinterpretation of his deed. 
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... south parcel" (R. 121 If 3 (Add, Tab G); 110 f 1 (Add, Tab H);4 97 % 4). 
In 1957, H.B. Simonsen, then president of the Helper State Bank, prepared the 
reciprocal quitclaim deeds dividing the property (R. 121 f 5 (Add., Tab G); 111 f 3 
(Add., Tab H); 46 ^ 5). The instruments he prepared described the right-of-way as 
follows: 
Beginning at a point on the North line of the ... [southern, H.B. Simonsen] 
tract of land, which point is 835 feet North and 787 feet West of the 
Southeast corner of the SW% of the NWVi of Section 5, Township 13 
South, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence North 485 
feet more or less to the County Road; thence East 60; thence South 490 feet 
more or less to the North line of said above described tract of land; thence 
Northwesterly along said North line of said described tract of land 61 feet 
more or less to the point of beginning. 
(R. 169.) As H.B. Simonsen described it in the 
reciprocal deeds, however, his north property 
line—that is, the line between the two 
brothers' respective parcels—did not follow 
the agreed-upon fence line boundary (R. 121 f 
5(Add,TabG)). 
Simple geometr> places the described
 Hgure L For aimtrative purposes 0fdy% 
this image shows the two parcels, the 
line far north of the fence line, falling at a listing fenced right-of-way, and the 
county road to which it connects, as they 
much steeper slope northwest to southeast existed on September 30, 1997. (From 
http://terraserver.com) (cf. R. 288-89). 
4
 Record pages 110-12 (Add., Tab H) are the Memorandum Decision entered in 
Radakovich v. Simonsen (7th District, No. 9439) in December of 1968. 
than the fence line (compare R. 402-05 with R. 294-95). As a result, the 490-foot-long, 
60-foot-wide right-of-way described in the deeds falls about 400 feet shy of the fence line 
that is the actual northern boundary of what would be the dominant estate if the right-of-
way actually connected with it (R. 402-05). In addition, the right-of-way as described in 
the deeds doesn't follow the line of the existing right-of-way; the former extends directly 
northward from its sole intersection with the latter, at the existing, fenced right-of-way's 
northern end. The fenced right-of-way varies in width, but is nowhere wider than about 
50 feet (again, compare R. 402-05 
with R. 287-95). 
Unaware of the botched 
descriptions in the deeds, however, 
both of the Simonsen brothers and 
their families continued to use their 
respective parcels according to 
their original oral understanding, 
treating the fence line as the 
division between their properties 
and using the existing fenced right-
60-foot right-of-way 
as described ill 1957 
and 1997 deeds 
NORTH i f 
of-way for access (R. 122 fflj 6-7 
123112(iW</.,TabG)). 
Radakovkh Properly 
Figure 2. Again, for illustrative purposes only, this 
graphic shows the approximate, relative positions 
of the existing fenced right-of-way and the right-of 
Tn November of 1964 wa^ as described in the reciprocal Simonsen and 
Simonsen-Radakovich deeds, (ct R. 287-95; 405.) 
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ignorant of the inconsistencies between the original intent and the deeds he had drawn up, 
H.B. Simonsen sold the south parcel to Robert Radakovich (R. 117-18, 122 % 8 {Add, 
Tab G)). The warranty deed included the erroneous description appearing on the 1957 
quitclaim deeds (R. 117; 122 \ 8 {Add., Tab G)). Unlike the Simonsen brothers, though, 
Radakovich had examined both the property and the deed description and was well aware 
of the discrepancy when he purchased the south parcel (R. 122-23 f^ 9 {Add., Tab G)). In 
January 1968, pointing to the erroneous description, Radakovich sued Elrie and Bertha 
Simonsen, seeking to lay claim to a larger parcel than H.B. Simonsen had sold him (R. 
70-71; 111 f 4 {Add, Tab H); 123 1 1 {Add, Tab G)), despite the fact that both 
Simonsen brothers and their families had always treated the fence line as the boundary 
and had always used the existing fenced right-of-way for access (R. I l l fflf 2, 3, & 4 
{Add, Tab H); 122 f t 6-7; 123 f 12 {Add, Tab G)). 
On December 24, 1968, the Seventh District Court handed down a Memorandum 
Decision (R. 110-12; Add., Tab H) in which it ruled against Radakovich. In the present 
action, the 1968 Memorandum Decision ruled on the right-of-way thus: 
It was agreed between H[.B.] Simonsen and Elrie Simonsen ... that the land 
lying north of said fence line should belong to Elrie Simonsen and the land 
lying south thereof should belong to H[.B.] Simonsen with the further 
proviso that H[.B.] Simonsen should have the non-exclusive right to use the 
existing fenced right of way traversing the ... north parcel for entry to [and] 
exit from the said south parcel. 
... [I]t follows that the defendants [Elrie and Bertha Simonsen] are 
entitled to a decree against plaintiffs [Robert and Ellen Radakovich] 
quieting defendants' title to the land lying north of the said division line, 
subject nevertheless to plaintiffs' right to use the said right of way. 
(R. 110 If 1, & 111-12 {App., Tab H) (emphasis added).) The "said right of way" in the 
last paragraph is "the existing fenced right of way traversing the ... north parcel" in the 
first. The 1969 Findings and Conclusions contain much the same language (R. 121 %3 
(App., Tab G)), but also declare that 
A fenced right of way exists and has existed for many years across the 
north parcel which serves both parcels for entry and exit. 
Defendants [Elrie and Bertha Simonsen] are entitled to a decree of 
the court quieting their title to the land [north of the dividing line] ... 
against plaintiffs [Radakovich] and all persons claiming by, through or 
under them subject, however, to the right in plaintiffs to use the said fenced 
right of way in common with defendants to serve their said parcel. 
(R. 123 W 12 (finding) & 2 (conclusion) (App., Tab G) (emphasis added).) Note, again, 
that the "said fenced right of way" in the last paragraph refers to the "fenced right of 
way" named in the first paragraph and which has long existed over the northern parcel. 
On June 23, 1972, Elrie and Bertha Simonsen conveyed their interest in the north 
parcel to Mattie and William Cornaby (R. 114-15). The 1972 quitclaim deed correctly 
described the existing fenced right-of-way across the north parcel consistent with the 
1969 court ruling: 
the non-exclusive right in Robert Radakovich and Ellen R. Radakovich, 
husband and wife, their successors and assigns to use the fenced right of 
way over and across said parcel for entry to and exit from their lands within 
the southwest quarter of the northwest quarter of section 5, township 13 
south, range 7 east of the Salt Lake meridian. 
(R. 114.) This fenced right-of-way, which has always been used for entry to and exit from 
both parcels, has never been moved, and remains today in the same location in which it 
lay at the time of the 1972 conveyance and the 1969 Findings and Conclusions (R. 49 Tf 
24; 99 Tf 11; 307 f^ 7). Neither the Simonsen brothers nor Radakovich (nor, of course, the 
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Cornabys) has ever recognized the 60-foot right-of-way described in the Simonsens' 
reciprocal deeds and perpetuated in H.B. Simonsen's deed to Radakovich: only the 
fenced right-of-way, which has existed since before the separation of the parcels in 1957, 
has ever been used to access the south parcel (R. 242 fflf 4-7; 244 fflf 4-7; 246 fflf 4-7; 248 
Tit 3-6; 402-05). 
In December of 1997, by means of a "Correctional Warranty Deed, Robert 
Radakovich conveyed his interest in the south parcel to the trustees of the Ellen R. 
Radakovich Marital and Family Trust (R. 130-31). In this deed, Radakovich completely 
ignored the 1969 ruling and included the original, erroneous 60-foot right-of-way 
description (id.). 
The present case arose in May of 2002, when Radakovich again brought suit, 
attempting again to use H.B. Simonsen's erroneous description as leverage to enlarge his 
estate with a 60-foot-wide right-of-way (R. 30-35 fflf 2, 5, & 8).5 The trial court ruled in 
favor of Radakovich and against the Cornabys: "The deeds referred to in plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment and the four undisputed affidavits furnished by plaintiffs 
establish the right of way as being 60' in width." (R. 299-300; Add, Tab C; cf. R. 306-
5
 Radakovich's original Complaint (R. 1-6) explicitly admitted that the ruling in 
the 1968 dispute (Radakovich v. Simonsen (7th District, No. 9439)) "determined that the 
plaintiffs' predecessors in interest ... were entitled to a right-of-way" (R. 2 \ 4). In order 
to avoid res judicata, however, Radakovich deleted this allegation from his Amended 
Complaint, although the only substantive justification offered for the amendment was the 
addition of the Cornaby Trusts (R. 23). The right-of-way was not mentioned in 
Radakovich's Memorandum in Support of his Motion to Amend, however (R. 21-24); all 
that is there stated is that "[t]he amended Complaint also contains further allegations 
which clarify and further explain the basis for the Complaint" (R. 23). Removal of a fatal 
admission, though, is not a "further allegation." 
07 Iflj 7-14 (Findings) & 6-7 (Conclusions); Add Tab E.) Problematically, of course, the 
trial court's Ruling, Findings and Conclusions, and Order, although they take pains to 
discuss the existence and width of the right-of-way claimed by Radakovich, say nothing 
at all about its location. Indeed, the right-of-way created by the trial court is entirely 
unworkable: it is worthless where the erroneous deed language places it, but it is 
unplottable where Radakovich wishes it drawn, since no description exists defining its 
situation. The Cornabys filed a 60(b) Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider on March 14, 
2005 (R. 312-13), offering the trial court a chance to explain its Ruling. 
From the trial court's denial of their Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider (R. 460-
62, Add. Tab C), the Cornabys appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused the Cornabys' invitation under 
Rule 60(b)(6) to reconsider and clarify its grant of unclear and internally inconsistent 
summary judgment to Radakovich. The court's Ruling, Findings and Conclusions, and 
Order conflated two irreconcilable rights-of-way: that appearing in the Simonsen-to-
Radakovich deed—a description neither correct nor workable—and the fenced right-of-
way which has existed for many years. By so doing, the trial court created a 60-foot-wide 
right-of-way without any specific boundaries or baseline from which to be measured. 
Moreover, the trial court empowered Radakovich, the owner of the dominant estate, to 
select the boundaries of this new right-of-way wherever he desires them. The law is clear, 
however, that the power to fix the location of undescribed servitudes belongs with the 
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owner of the servient estate—the Cornabys, in this case. In addition, failure to rectify an 
erroneous easement description in a judgment is a recognized abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO CLARIFY 
ITS GRANT TO RADAKOVICH OF A FORMLESS, PLACELESS RIGHT-OF-WAY 
ACROSS THE CORNABYS' LAND. 
— I — 
The Two Rights-of-Way Before the Trial 
Court were Irreconcilable. 
Although Radakovich would wish it otherwise, this dispute brought before the trial 
court two different rights-of-way: the right-of-way appearing in the reciprocal Simonsen 
deeds and the "fenced right of way ... [that] has existed for many years across the 
[Cornabys5] north parcel [and] which serves both parcels for entry and exit" (R. 123 1} 12, 
App. Tab G). The fenced right-of-way—an unpaved road more than half a century old— 
branches off southwesterly from the county road to the north {see Figures 1 & 2, above), 
across a culvert, and so on down through the Cornabys' land to that of Radakovich (R. 
284-95). The right-of-way described in the 1964 Simonsen-to-Radakovich deed (R. 117— 
18; see Figure 2, above), on the other hand, touches the fenced right-of-way only at its 
own southern end, begins at a non-existent boundary line, runs straight north "485 feet 
more or less" (R. 169) across a stream (there is no bridge), across the county road to 
which it is supposed to lead, and on several hundred feet further, where it ends in an 
empty field. 
The self-evident uselessness of the Simonsen-Radakovich right-of-way is belied 
by the ferocity with which Radakovich has pursued it. Evidently believing he could claim 
the width and leave the location, Radakovich laid vehement claim to this pointless 
servitude in his argument for summary judgment: 
It is[, argued Radakovich,] an undisputed fact that Elrie Simonsen deeded a 
sixty foot right of way to H.B. Simonsen in 1957. The Defendants have ... 
presented no admissible evidence to dispute the fact that H.B. Simonsen 
deeded the same 60 foot wide right of way to the Plaintiff in 1964. It is an 
undisputed fact that H.B. Simonsen deeded the exact same 60 foot wide 
right of way to the Plaintiff, Robert Radakovich, in 1964. 
(R. 161 (citations omitted, emphasis added).) By claiming "the exact same" right-of-way, 
Radakovich has essentially demanded, and obtained, what amounts to a sort of pointless 
easement in gross—a 500-foot trapezoid, 60 feet wide, upon which he and his can wander 
perforce aimlessly, since it doesn't go anywhere. 
From its description, this impractical right-of-way plainly has nothing to do with 
the existing fenced right-of-way (save for a few hundred square feet of overlap far from 
the Cornaby-Radakovich boundary line). Unlike its pointless counterpart, the fenced 
right-of-way was worn into the landscape decades ago by generations of hooves, feet, and 
wheels. The fenced right-of-way, as practical as its would-be doppelganger is quixotic, 
runs from the actual boundary between the two parcels to the county road, passing only 
briefly through the bizarre boundaries of the Radakovich right-of-way. 
The two cannot be reconciled ... nor were they. 
— II — 
The Trial Court Failed in its Obligation to Delineate 
the Right-of-Way it Bestowed on Radakovich. 
In its February 1, 2005, Ruling, the trial court declared that "[t]he deeds referred to 
in plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the four undisputed affidavits furnished 
by plaintiffs establish the right of way as being 60' in width" (R. 300; App. Tab F). The 
derivative Findings and Conclusions echo this determination (although surreptitiously 
attempting to divorce themselves from the aimless deed description): "The deeds referred 
to in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment establish the existing right of way as 
being sixty (60) feet in width throughout its length" (R. 306 ^ 11; App. Tab E).6 The 
"deeds referred to," however, have nothing to do with the placement of the existing 
fenced right-of-way; they refer without exception to the useless construct unintentionally 
created by H.B. Simonsen in 1957. And the "four undisputed affidavits" upon which the 
court relied include only vague estimates as to width; they say nothing at all about where 
along its length the right-of-way was 60 feet wide (R. 186 ffl[ 5 & 8; 188 fflj 5 & 7; 190 ffi[ 
5 & 7; 192 Ifif 5 & 7; cf. R. 284-295, esp. photo on 288, 295). 
What the trial court has done, in short, is grant to Radakovich a right-of-way, 60 
feet wide (based upon the spurious deed description) along the length of the existing 
fenced right-of-way (which has not historically been of a uniform 60-foot width 
throughout), without bothering to specify where this 60 feet is to be measured from. In 
this, the trial court erred grievously. Are the parties to measure the mandated 60 feet, for 
6
 Interestingly, by the time one works from the trial court's Ruling to the Findings 
and Conclusions prepared by Radakovich, and thence to the Order (also prepared by 
Radakovich), the deed description under which Radakovich marched at the outset of the 
litigation has been skillfully diluted until it no longer remains. The February 24, 2005, 
Order states blandly, "The right of way which now exists and has existed for many years, 
and which provides access to the Plaintiffs' property over Defendants' property, is 
confirmed as and shall be sixty feet wide throughout its length" (R. 309 f 5; App. Tab 
D). The subtlety is impressive, but this is not what the trial court ruled. 
instance, as 30 feet on either side of the centerline of the existing access road? or 60 feet 
from the eastern boundary? or 30 feet on either side of a line drawn at the whim of 
Radakovich? This point, unaddressed by the trial court, should be the main priority in a 
dispute over the location of an undescribed right-of-way. 
Only recently, the Utah Court of Appeals and Supreme Court addressed the 
question of unplotted servitudes. The Court of Appeals addressed the issue in July of 
2004, in Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of Utah County, 2004 UT App 256, 97 
P.3d 697. Evans turned on the validity of a reserved easement the location of which was 
not described in the original reservation. The trial court ruled the easement invalid, but 
the Utah Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that "[t]he failure of an easement 
description to specify details, such as the exact location ... does not render the easement 
excessively vague or unenforceable." 2004 UT App 256, [^ 10 (quoting Egidi v. 
Libertyville, 621 N.E.2d 615, 622 (111. App. 1993)).7 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed, Evans v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Utah County, 2005 UT 74, 123 P.3d 432, endorsing the principle that, 
[a]lthough certainly desirable in most instances, language fixing the 
location of an easement is not always necessary when other terms of the 
7
 Relevant to the present dispute was the Court of Appeals' observation that 
"[w]hen a deed creating an easement explicitly refers to an existing road, the courts 
commonly construe the location and dimensions of the intended easement to conform 
with the location and dimensions of the road." 2004 UT App 256, [^12 (quoting Mitchell 
v. Chance, 149 S.W.3d 40, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)). In the present case, of course, the 
trial court did not construe the right-of-way to conform with the dimensions of the 
existing road, but instead redefined the existing road to conform with its reading of the 
right-of-way. 
easement safeguard the servient estate from the risk that its burden may be 
greater than that for which it bargained. 
2005 UT 74 at \ 13 (emphasis added). The Court noted, in addition, that when confronted, 
as in Evans, with a 
sizeable quantity of evidence firmly establishing] an intent to create an 
easement and unambiguously defining] all essential features of the 
servitude except its location. . . . [the Courts] have an obligation to explore 
whether the deed's failure to identify the location of the easement can be 
remedied without altering in any material way the bargain struck between 
the grantor and grantee. 
Id. at TJ16. The Court characterized the judicial function in unfixed easement cases as an 
exercise similar to contractual "gap-filling." Id. (citing Corbin on Contracts, § 4.1 (rev. 
ed. 1993)). Ultimately, after considering the necessity of ensuring that judicial gap-
filling does not alter the scope of the servitude bargained for, id. at f^ 19, the Court 
adopted an approach that places the power to locate an unfixed servitude in the owner of 
the servient estate, id. at f20. Under this "practical approach to the problem," the Court 
observed, 
the owner of the servient estate is entitled to designate a reasonable location 
for the easement. If the servient owner fails to make such a designation 
within a reasonable period, the easement holder may select a reasonable 
route. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, a court may specify a 
location for the easement. 
8
 "If the parties have concluded a transaction in which it appears that they intend 
to make a contract, the court should not frustrate their intention if it is possible to reach a 
fair and just result, even though this requires a choice among conflicting meanings and 
the filling of some gaps that the parties have left." Corbin on Contracts, § 4.1 (rev. 
ed.1993). 
Id. at f21 (quoting Jon W. Bruce & James W. Ely, Jr., The Law of Easements and 
Licenses in Land, f^ 7.02[2][a] (rev. ed. 2000)). This arrangement for the placement of an 
unfixed servitude, the Court concluded, "removes the issue of whether location selection 
is an essential term from the field of battle with neither side sustaining injury." Id. at 19. 
Thus, in the present dispute, the Cornabys' quarrel is not with the enforcement of 
an unfixed right-of-way, but with the trial court's failure to have fulfilled its gap-filling 
duty under the Evans rule. Given that Cornaby and Radakovich cannot reach an 
agreement as to the situation of the right-of-way, the trial court's duty was to specify a 
location. This, however, the trial court utterly failed to do. 
— Ill — 
The Trial Court Abused its Discretion When it 
Failed to Grant Relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
In its August 31, 2005, Ruling denying the Cornabys' 60(b)(6) Motion to Clarify 
and/or Reconsider, the trial court commented, 
Although ... the Supreme Court of Utah ... acknowledge^] that 
"extraordinary circumstances may arise when it is appropriate to request a 
trial court to reconsider a ruling[,]" ... the court cannot find that 
extraordinary circumstances exist in this case that would justify a 
reconsideration. 
(R. 460; Add Tab C (quoting Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, f 18 n.5, 100 P.3d 1151).) 
In other words, the trial court concluded that the confusion in the description of the 
easement was not a reason justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The trial court, however, 
was mistaken. 
This Court has already determined that a mistaken easement description in a 
judgment constitutes a "reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." In 
Kungler v. O M , 855 P.2d 270, 274-75 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), the Court upheld a trial 
court's clarification of a judgment when it had misdescribed the easement; 
The record clearly shows the court thought it was entering a judgment 
factually consistent with its legal ruling that the historical width of the 
easement was from the fence line as it existed at the time of the trial to the 
quarter-section line. It was not until the appellants surveyed the land and 
moved the fence line that the court or parties realized the judgment did not 
accurately memorialize the court's legal determination. At the clarification 
hearing, the trial court explained why it described the west boundary of the 
easement as being sixteen feet west of the quarter-section line in its original 
judgment. The court, without the benefit of a survey, relied on an erroneous 
exhibit that both parties testified from to conclude the quarter-section line 
was sixteen feet east of the fence line. . . . 
. . . . The judge specifically found in its new judgment and order that 
the reason for the revision was "to make factually correct the description" 
and "to conform to the Court's ruling that the easement was from the West 
Boundary of the Plaintiffs property up to where the fence existed at the 
time of Trial" (the historical location). The court's factual description of its 
legal ruling was based on evidence submitted and relied on by both parties. 
That evidence was later found to be erroneous, making the factual 
description of the legal ruling incorrect. The legal ruling remained intact; 
the memorialization of it in the judgment no longer was. Both parties 
motioned the court to clarify the now unclear judgment. We believe the 
correcting of the judgment was a justifiable reason to change the original 
order under Rule 60(b). 
In the present case, of course, the Comabys sought remediation of the trial court's 
judgment less than a three weeks after the entry of the court's Findings and Conclusions 
and Order. If correction under 60(b)(6) is proper after many months, as in Kungler, it is 
certainly proper here: 
When the trial court's mistakes—not counsel's—are the reason a judgment 
is improvidently entered ... the court should be anxious to do whatever 
needs to be done to fix the mistake as soon as it is called to the court's 
attention. It did not do so here. The trial court thus exceeded the bounds of 
sound discretion in denying [the Comabys'] motion under rule 60(b)(6) for 
relief from judgment. 
Oseguera v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 UT App 46, f 12, 68 P.3d 1008. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's failure to grant the Cornabys relief pursuant to their Rule 60(b)(6) 
Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider constituted a clear abuse of discretion. For the 
reasons given herein, the Cornabys respectfully request that this Court (1) reverse the trial 
court's August 31, 2005, Order denying the Cornabys' Motion, (2) set aside the 
judgment, and (3) remand this matter to the trial court to specifically identify the location 
of the right-of-way at issue. 
DATED this fi^ day of January, 2006, 
i*-*C&u~~o 
D. Scott Croot 
Scott M. Ellsworth 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendants 
David Maddox 
Attorney for Defendants 
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The following documents are attached: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c) and 60(b) Tab A 
Notice of Appeal, September 28, 2005. Tab B 
Ruling on Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider, August 31, 2005. Tab C 
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and Denying Defendants' Countermotion Tab D 
for Summary Judgment, February 24, 2005. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, February 24, 2005. Tab E 
Ruling on Motions for Summary judgment, February 1, 2005. Tab F 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed February 3, 1969, in 
Radakovich v. Simonsen (Seventh District Court, No. 9439). 
Memorandum Decision, filed December 24, 1968, in 
Radakovich v. Simonsen (Seventh District Court, No. 9439). 
TabG 
TabH 
Tab A 
URCP Rule 56, Summary judgment 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and 
affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order, 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered 
evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court 
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct 
of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion 
shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, 
order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR AUG 3 1 ?P 5 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH : 
ROBERT RADOKOVICH, individually 
and ROBERT RADAKOVICH and 
ELLEN RADAKOVICH TRUSTEES 
OF THE ROBERT RADAKOVICH 
MARITAL AND FAMILY TRUST, ; 
Plaintiffs, ] 
VS. ] 
MATTIE CORNABY and AL ) 
CORNABY, et al. 
Defendants. ) 
) RULING ON MOTION 
TO CLARIFY AND/OR 
) RECONSIDER 
1 Case No. 020700486 
1 Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The court issued a ruling on the parties' respective motions for summary judgment on 
January 31, 2005, and directed plaintiffs' counsel to prepare a summary judgment consistent with 
the ruling. A Summary Judgment was signed by the court on February 24, 2005, after the 
defendants' time to object had expired. On March 14, 2005, the defendants filed a Motion to 
Clarify and/or Reconsider to which the plaintiffs filed an Objection. A Reply was filed and the 
court heard oral argument on June 2, 2005, and allowed both counsel additional time to submit 
additional memorandum. The court took the Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider under 
advisement and the matter is ripe for decision. 
Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize motions to reconsider, the 
Supreme Court of Utah in Shipman v. Evans, 100 P.3d 1151, n. 5. (Utah 2004), acknowledged 
that "extraordinary circumstances may arise when it is appropriate to request a trial court to 
reconsider a ruling." However, the court cannot find that extraordinary circumstances exist in this 
case that would justify a reconsideration. The Motion to Clarify and/or Reconsider is denied. 
DATED this 31st day of August, 2005. 
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JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, individually and 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH and ELLEN R. 
RADAKOVICH TRUSTEES OF THE 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH MARITAL AND 
FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MATTIE CORNABY, AL CORNABY, 
individuals, and WILLIAM ARGYLE 
CORNABY TRUST and 
MATTIE CORNABY TRUST, and JAY 
BARNEY CORNABY, DALE BARNEY, 
GAYLENE C. ROSENTHAL, ALBERT 
CORNABY, TRUSTEES 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO 
STRIKE, AND DENYING 
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERMOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 020700486 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
This matter came before the Court on oral arguments on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court having heard oral arguments of the parties, having reviewed the memoranda filed on this 
matter by both parties, having reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, having reviewed 
the relevant facts and case law, and otherwise being fully advised in the premise, now ORDERS, 
ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; 
2. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby is granted as to 
paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15; 
3. Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike the Supplemental Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby is granted; 
4. Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied; 
5. The right of way which now exists and has existed for many years, and which 
provides access to the Plaintiffs' property over the Defendants' property, is confirmed as and shall 
be sixty feet wide throughout its length; 
6. Plaintiffs are entitled to construct fences marking the sixty foot wide right of way 
from the entrance of the right of way to the point at which it accesses Plaintiffs5 property; 
7. Defendants are ordered to remove any obstacles impeding or lying in the sixty foot 
wide right of way; 
8. Defendants are to pay Plaintiffe' costs in the amount of $225.81. 
DATED and SIGNED this pij day of February, 2005. 
BY THE COURT 
"^ ). ^ <a£^ ^\^^^y^f^ 
Ju3ge Bry/e K. Bryner 
Approved as to Form: // 
David Maddox 
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JOHN H. ROMNEY, #9160 
JEFFS & JEFFS, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Telephone: (801) 373-8848 
Facsimile: (801) 373-8878 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH, individually and 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH and ELLEN R. 
RADAKOVICH TRUSTEES OF THE 
ROBERT RADAKOVICH MARITAL AND 
FAMILY TRUST, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MATTIE CORNABY, AL CORNABY, 
individuals, and WILLIAM ARGYLE 
CORNABY TRUST and 
MATTIE CORNABY TRUST, and JAY 
BARNEY CORNABY, DALE BARNEY, 
GAYLENE C. ROSENTHAL, ALBERT 
CORNABY, TRUSTEES 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 020700486 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
This matter came before the Court on oral arguments on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, and Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment. The 
Court heard oral arguments of the parties, reviewed the memoranda filed on this matter by both 
parties, reviewed the papers and pleadings on file herein, made its rulings dated the 31st day of January 
2005. The Court granted the Plaintiffs' Motion to Strike, granted the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and denied the Defendants' Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court has considered all memoranda submitted by the parties, the arguments presented at 
hearing, the relevant case law and statutory provisions, and being fully advised in the matter and 
having issued its Memorandum Decision on January 31, 2005, now issues the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Paragraphs 7 and 11 of the Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby are conclusory and are not 
supported by specific evidentiary facts. 
2. Paragraphs, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, and 15 are conclusory, are not supported by specific 
evidentiary facts, and are not based on personal knowledge. 
3. The Supplementary Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby does not effect paragraphs 7,8,9,10, 
11, 12, 14 and 15 of the original Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby and is self-serving. 
4. The Warranty Deed from H.B. Simonsen to the Robert Radakovich conveyed real 
property, together with a 60 foot right of way. 
5. In 1968, a dispute arose between Robert Radakovich and Elrie Simonsen regarding 
the location of the division line between their properties. 
6. The width of the right of way at issue in this litigation was not addressed, nor was it 
in dispute in the 1968 litigation. 
2 
7. The issue presented for determination by the court in 1968 was the location of the 
division line between the two properties, not the width of the right of way. 
8. The only issue addressed by the court was the division line between the north properly 
(owned by Elrie and Bertha Simonsen) and the south property (owned by H.B. Simonsen's successor, 
Robert Radakovich). 
9. The width of the right of way issue presented in this litigation is not identical to the 
issue presented in the 1968 litigation. 
10. The width of the right issue presented in this litigation was not completely, fully and 
fairly litigated in the 1968 litigation. 
11. The deeds referred to in Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment establish the 
existing right of way as being sixty (60) feet in width throughout its length. 
12. The Affidavits in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment establish the 
existing right of way as being sixty (60) feet in width throughout its length. 
13. The 1968 court referred to a "fenced right of way" for convenience purposes only, and 
not as a limitation as to the width of the right of way. 
14. There is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the sixty (60) foot width of the right 
of way. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, and 15 and 11 of the Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby 
should be stricken. 
3 
2. The Supplementary Affidavit of Mattie Cornaby should be stricken. 
3. The issue preclusion branch of res judicata does not apply to the present litigation. 
4. The claim preclusion branch of res judicata does not apply to the present litigation. 
5. The Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
6. Because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the sixty (60) foot wide 
right of way, the Plaintiffs' are entitled to summary judgment. 
7. The right of way which now exists and has existed for many years, and which provides 
access to the Plaintiffs' property over the Defendants' property, is confirmed as and shall be sixty feet 
wide throughout its length; 
8. Plaintiffs are entitled to construct fences marking the sixty foot wide right of way from 
the entrance of the right of way to the point at which it accesses Plaintiffs' property; 
9. Defendants are required to remove any obstacles impeding or lying in the sixty foot 
wide right of way; 
10. Defendants are to pay Plaintiffs' costs. 
DATED and SIGNED t h i ^ J day of February, 2005 
BY THE COURT 
y^y.TT^C^ 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
Approved as to Form: / 
David Maddox 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURTS 
) RULING ON MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Case No. 020700486 
) Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 7, 2004, to which the 
defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition. A Reply was filed by the plaintiffs. The 
defendants filed a Counter Motion for Summary Judgment and the plaintiffs filed a Memorandum 
in Opposition to which the defendants filed a Reply. The court heard oral on both motions for 
summary judgment, took the motions under advisement, and now issues the following rulings: 
I. Relief Requested 
The plaintiffs' motion requests the court to: (1) confirm the existence of a sixty foot right-
of-way in favor of the plaintiffs; (2) order the defendants to allow the plaintiffs to construct 
fences marking the sixty foot right of way; (3) order the defendants to remove any obstacles 
impeding the sixty foot wide right of way; (4) award costs; and (5) to grant any other and further 
relief as may be proper. 
The defendants' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment requests the court to: (1) dismiss 
the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint on the basis that all issues in dispute pursuant to the 
Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) deny 
plaintiffs' Motion for summary Judgment; (3) for costs and expenses; and (4) for such other and 
further relief as may be just and proper in the premises. 
II. Ruling 
A. Defendantsy Motion for Summary Judgment The defendants claim that res judicata 
preludes the relief quested by the plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint. The court finds that the 
doctrine of res judicata does not apply to this case because the issue of the size of the right of 
way was not addressed in the 1968 litigation. A close reading of the memorandum decision 
reveals that the court was not determining the size or the location of the right of way. The issue 
presented for determination by the court in 1968 was the location of the division line between the 
two properties. Although the court in its decision acknowledged the existence of a right of way 
which was located between two fence lines, it did not address the width of Ihe right of way 
because the width was not in issue. The only issue addressed by the court was the division line 
between the north property (owned by Elrie and Bertha Simonsen) and the south property (owned 
by H.B. Simonsen's successor, Robert Radakovich). 
Specifically, the second element of issue preclusion requires that the issue decided in the 
prior adjudication be identical to the one presented in the first action. Because the width of the 
right of way was not litigated in the 1968 lawsuit, but is the subject of the present litigation, 
defendants cannot succeed on the claim of issue preclusion, The issue presented in the present 
litigation, i.e., the actual width of the right of way, is not identical to the issue presented in the 
first action. 
The court further finds that an examination of the court's decision in 1968 reveals that not 
only was the issue of the width of a right of way not addressed, it was not completely, fully, and 
fairly litigated as required by the third element of issue preclusion. 
To succeed on claim preclusion the defendants must establish three elements, the second of 
which requires the claim that is alleged to be barred to have been presented in the first suit or be 
one that could and should have been raised in the first suit. Once again, the court finds that the 
issue of the width of the right of way was not presented in the first suit which addressed only the 
location of the dividing line between the two properties. As to whether the issue of the right of 
way could and should have been presented in the first suit, no evidence has been produced that 
the parties had a dispute about the width of the right of way at the time of the first suit. Thus, 
there is no evidence that the width of the right of way should have been litigated at the time of 
the first suit. Accordingly, the defendants cannot avail themselves of the doctrine of claim 
preclusion. 
Based on the foregoing the court concludes that res judicata is not applicable under the 
circumstances of this case and the defendants' Counter Motion for Summary Judgment on that 
basis is denied. 
B. Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment: The plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted for the reason that the court finds that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact, i.e., the width of the right of way. The affidavit of Mattie Cornaby has been stricken 
and the defendants have raised no genuine issue of material fact as to the width of the right 
of way. The deeds referred to in plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and the four 
undisputed affidavits furnished by plaintiffs establish the right of way as being 60' in width. 
Although the 1968 court referred to the "fenced right of way" for convenience purposes, the 
defendants have not produced any evidence that the right of way is not 60' in width. 
The plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Plaintiffs' counsel is directed to 
prepare a Summary Judgment in harmony with this ruling. 
DATED this 31st day of January, 2005. 
3/yce K. Bryner, Judg 
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IK THE DISTRICT COURT WITHIN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT HADAKOVICH and 
RLLEN R. RADAKOVICH, 
Husband and Wife , 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BMUB Hi SIMONSEN and 
m m m A, SIHONSEN, 
Husband and w i f e , 
De fendant s . 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
CARBON COUNTS UTAH 
**z* F! L E D s s ^ 
DCC2JI96S 
5 . H, YOUNG, CUttK 
C i v i l No. 9439 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
This esse cams n« to b§ heard btfers this court sitting without 
a jury at Price, Utah, on tho 16 day of Auguit, 1968, Plaintiff! appeared 
in person and by their attorney, Thorit Hatch*. Defendants*appeared in porion 
and by their attorney, Thorald N» Jensen, Trial resumed August 21 and con-
> 
cludod August 22. By agreement of\the parties tha court in tht presence of 
counsel viewed tho premises on October 3 end counsel*fully argued the caaa 
to the court on the following day, October 4.' The court has duly considered 
the law And evJdcnco and now states its decision as followst 
1 The avidence preponderates to and supports tho conclusion that 
ilariia Siru-son, row deceased, *"d his brother, the defendant Klrie Simonson 
i- tic ^ onr 1955 or 1^56 agrcad on * parmencnt phyiical diviiion between them 
o£ tho Southwest Quarter of tho Northwest Quarter of Section 5, Township 13 
South, Rango 7 East of tho Salt Lake Meridian in Carbon^County, Utah, which 
land was owned by them as tenants in common, and shortly/thereafter they com-
menced and during that year or the following year complotod the construction 
of a substantial fence along tho agreed division line including the installation 
of a metal gate, the adjacent posts of which were sot in concrete* It was 
agreed between Harris and Blrie'ilmonion*at the time of said diviiion'that the 
land lying north of said fanca Una anouid beion* to Hirie^imonsen'and the 
UfttTlyiin south tthiMO^shiufil belong to H I M I I SlmoniinvVltfi thif!uipbhi* 
proviso that^Harris/Siraonaen should have the non-exclusive^right'to^us* the 
existing fenoad right ""of way traversing tho said north paroel for" entry to 
exit from the said south'psraal> 
-*• 
2, Thereafter Harrla and Elrie Slaotutn and their vivee Mdt laprove-
tjt*t« uqw^  ete4 otbtrwUe excitative iy *a*4 «a4 occ*?ic4 U*ir recfective pexcele. 
Including the dwelling houaea thereon, and in ail particulara honored the aaid 
diviiion ilrii eetabllahed between then. Said conduct continued to the tine aaid 
Harrla Simons en and h la wife conveyed to plaintiff! lit November of the year 1964. 
3, In the moantimo the reciprocal quit elate deeds executed and re-
corded between Harrla end Eirle Simon*en on or about December'27, 1957, did not 
correctly deecribe the aaid diviaion line ao agreed upon between them and 
thereforo did not expreae their true agreement and intent, but the aaid partiea* 
aa aforaeeld, continued.to acknowledge and respectaaid fenced diviaion line 
during all of the ansulng eeven y«ar* (1957-1964) and up to the data of the 
dctad of plalntlffi, each running hit atock and otherwiae excluaivaly uiing and 
poeieaeihg hii reepective parcel and the improver^ nta thereon^ Said d a e d a l 
prepared by Harrla Simonaen; defer^^ 
tho ield fence line >and did not learn of the error in aaid^cecla, ,at lee it until 
the year following the purchaio byplaintifff>from ! ^ 
1964. |*bm affair• prep^nde^ h:ce:r6f; the evidence^Xgaiao^conclwIe t^iJifttiHarriB 
8 Itttdnecn did no t Intend tovdeacr ibc"»the proper ty-,wh1lchi<n^ Iain tiff a 
t a l e vni.deecrltbed^iCtne^ . A ^ J ' ' : 
4, The plaintiffs prior'and at' the ^ tiW t^h^ y^ purch^ 'ae^ d-'froin'^ aVria 
Simonsen and his wife in the f a l l of 1964 went upon said 'premisesV;Wserved . ^ 
the laid aubatantiai division line^ ffence andogate^ rend the defendant! in actual 
phyalca1 occupancy, use «nd poiaoeeion;of the land.lying north of aaid fence 
line including tho dwelling houie thereon, |FfainllM^ 
deed from Harrla:Jiiii&hfejn^ in&^^  
concerning ttiriact'f&at^^ 
le gal description act- forthStn^the;deedfwhlcb|plaintiffi^receiyed^from;HarriaV 
Sitaonaen and hia wife* From thia and other evidence adduced^ cbheitide^ :(ancV:;:' 
hVld ^at fiainfcllfe^ M^ 
of the;relief eoughtby >diefenayn^ V^T/; 
Having reached:tn'ecohcluaiona;atated, it:; followa*that^^c;.defenianti 
are entitled to a decree agalnat-pialntlffa quieting'defehdahta.v^itie^to.the 
•3-
Land lying north of tho laid diviiion lino, tubjoel; rievortholoii to plaintiffs1 
right to uio laid.right of way, On thiir complaint plaintiffs are ontitlad 
to a decree againit dafondants quioting their title to the land lying louth 
of said diviiion line. Defendant! aro entitled to coiti. 
Coumel for defendant! may draw finding! and a decree in harmony 
with thii decision. • ' 
Done this 4 i^y of November, 1968, 
EXHIBIT H 
JN THE DISTRICT COURT VITHIH AMD FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT RAOAKOVICH AND 
ELLEN R# RAOAKOVICH, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
PLAINTIFFS, 
VS. 
ELRIE M. SINONSEN AND 
BERTHA A, SIMONSEN, 
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 
DEFENDANTS, 
5CVIHTH DISTRICT COURT 
CARftOM COUNTY, UTAH 
-<r, F IIE D *&*• 
CIVIL NO, 9*39 
PtHDIMQS QP FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THIS CASE CAME OH TO RE HEARD BEFORE THIS COURT SITTING 
WITHOUT A UURY AT PRICE, UTAH, ON THE ISTH DAY OF AUGUST,^ 1958. 
PLAINTIFFS APPEARED IN PERSON AND BY^THEIR ATTORNEY, THORIT HATCH. 
DEFENDANTS APPEARED IN PERSON AND 8Y THEIR ATTORNEY, THERALD N. 
UENSEN. TRIAL RESUMED AUGUST 21ST AMD CONCLUDED AUGUST 22ND. BY 
AGREEMENT OF THE, PARTIES THE COURT;!N THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL VIEWED 
THE PREMISES ON OCTOBER 3RD AND*COlN5EL FULLY ARGUED THE CASE TO 
THE COURT ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, OCTOBER «»TH. THE COURT HAS DULY 
CuSSlOERCD THE u*W AND EVIDENCE, SIGNED ITS » Ef'ORANDUM DECISION 
NOVEM8ER k, 1968 WHICH HAS BEEN DULY ENTERED HEREIN, AND NOW FINDS 
AND DECIDES: 
jM*wfctt'»«F nror 
It AT ALL TIMES RELEVANT TO THIS ACTION PLAINTIFFS WERE 
HUSOANO AND WIFE* AND WERE LIVING TOGETHER IN CARBON COUNTY, UTAH, AS 
WERE DEFENDANTS. 
2 . THE ,DEFENDANTrELR!'E M. SIMONSEN AND ONE HARRIS 
SIMONSEN WERE, BROTHERS. THEY WERE OWNERS AS TENANTS IN^COrtMON-OF 
VOLVED IN THISALAWSUIT* 
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3, THE SAID BROTHERS, HARRIS AND ELRIE SIMONSEN, IN THE 
YEAR 1955 OR 1956 ORALLY AGREED ON A PERMANENT PHYSICAL DIVISION 
BETWEEN THEM OF THE SAID FORTY ACRE PARCEL AND SHORTLY- THEREAFTER 
THEY COMMENCED AND DURING THAT YEAR OR THE FOLLOWING YEAR COMPLETED 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL FENCE ALONG THE AGREED" DIVISION 
LINE BETWEEN THEM INCLUDING THE INSTALLATION OF AMETAL GATE, THE 
ADJACENT;POSTS OF WHICH WERE SET-IN CONCRETE,, IT WAS *>RALLY AGREED 
BETWEEN HARRIS AND ELRIB SIMONSEN AT THE flME OF SAID DIVISION THAT 
THE LAND LYING NORTH OF SAID FENCE LINE SHOULD BELONG TO ELRIE 
SIMONSEN AND THE LAND.LYING SOUTH THEREOF SHOULD BELONG TO HARRIS 
SIMONSEN WITH THE FURTHER PROVISOTHAT: HARRIS:^ /S;iyONSEN;sSHpULfcHAVE 
* THE W N * E X C L U S | ^ : : 
TROVERS INGV THE S A M W ^ • 
SQ^TH;PM:CELr.v .. /;;'; \ - -$€;V • '•'.-••":' -^U... 
":. •' {V, 'UPOII;vS^b.;FORTY ACRE- PARCEL AT" 'ffi -
I S I ON WE RE TWO^ELLING^ HOUSES V; ;:'' 'AS;? A :%S.ui.r O f ^ T f i i ^ D $ ^ 
• • UPON /AND EFFECTED};BY^THE|;B;ROTHERS^ ONE;-DWELLING-HOUSE;^ • 
WiTHIN " THEvHARRli> SI"MONV^^^ CINE 
AND THE O T H E R ; ^ 
SAID DIVISION LINE* :'.'',.'"'.,. ^\SVZ^--^r^ ' ^^• •'''>•••-^ . 
. . ,5'; AT THE-'-TIME; Of THE Vs AI D'_ DI VIS I^;;A^C> LNTI L .HI 
^HAfmiS^SiMONSB 
-UTAH • HE/pi D:TH£ PAPER\W<^ .:•; -. 
THE .S AI D CO-OV/NERS ,';, ^ OEFENDANT^EtklE?S IiMONSE& ^ l ^ t | 0 P o C H r s ^ R O T H E R 
TO. TAKE- CARE; O ^ a E R I CAL • M A m AND-l : . 
LI VESTOCK,; ^ACCORDINGLY,:^ 
QUI T: CtXlM DEEDS :DI VI DING/SAI D : FORTY:: AC R E f f ^ l ^ 
OR. ABOUT DECEMBER 2J 
COfttECTl^DESCft lBEi^ 
• • • • - • - • • • . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . • : : , . . . ; • " • V ^ K " ' • - - " " 
mmmimm 
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G, NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXECUTION AND DELIVERY IN DEC-
EMBER OF 1957 OF SAID RECIPROCAL DEEDS CONTAINING SAID ERRONEOUS 
DESCRIPTIONS THE BROTHERS AND THEIR WIVES CONTINUED TO ACKNOWLEDGE 
AND RESPECT THE SAID FENCED DIVISION LINE BETWEEN THEM AT ALL TIMES 
DURING THE ENSUING SEVEN YEARS (UNTIL 196«» WHEN HARRIS SIMONSEN 
SOLD TO PLAINTIFFS AND WAS NO LONGER INTERESTED IN THE PARCEL). 
DURING THIS SEVEN YEAR PERIOD THE SAID.PARTIES RAN THEIR STOCK UPON, 
MADE IMPROVEMENTS UPON AND OTHERWISE EXCLUSIVELY USED AND POSSESSED. 
THEIR RESPECTIVE PARCELS AS V.'SLL'.r WH*Wtl% AND IMPROVEMENTS 
THEREON ACCORDING TO SAID FENCED DIVISION LINE. 
7r DEFENDANTS BELIEVED SAID DESCRIPTIONS SO PREPARED 
BY HARRIS SIMONSENFOLLOWED THE S A I D ' - r e N C B J ) ? t l N e : ^ p / O J p - N 6 T ISARN 
OF THE ERROR IN SAI D DEEDS AT.LEAST :UNTIL THE?YEAR ;FOLLOWlM* THE . 
PURHCASS QY PLAINTIFFS * R M ^ 
81 IN NOVEMOiirt*^ 
TEREST IN HIS LANDS IN THE; SCOFI ELD: A R E A ^ l N a ^ ^ 
SAID FORTY: ACRE P A R C E L / j O ^ P L ^ ^ . 
HARRIS SIMONSEN-j t^f#^ 
AMONG OTHERS THATJ%OTH;DW^ ... 
THE XARR-IS'- ilMONSBN D23CRIPfrOKV PROM A-'PArR^'PSEPbNDERANCK-- OF-ALL-
OF THE EVIDENCE IrPINO THAT HARRIS SIMONSEN IN CONVEY I W TO PLAINTIFFS 
DID NOT INTEND TO/EMPLOY THE ^ A I D ; : E R R 6 N E O U S ; DESCRlPTION.fHE WAS NOT 
AVAILABLE AS. A.WI TNESS AT .THE, TRIAL HEHAViNG D I E ^ P R I OR' TO THE FI LING. . 
OF THE COMPLAINT, • /-• "';/•> - ^ / J } ; ^ ; '"'.'"' J V - ••'"• ''•'. ' ".'' 'J.':' 
0 , THE PLAINTIFFS P R I O R ? ^ D ; A T T H E - T I M E V W 
FROM HARRIS SIMONSEN AND:>(lS7WIFB IN THE FALL .OF. 196«f WENT UPOti THE 
FORTY ACRE PARCEL, OBSERVED THE SUBSTANTIAL DIVISiON U N E ' r e K C E AND^ 
GATE AND THE DEFENDANTS: IN A V U A ^ ^ 
POSSESSION OP THE: LAND LYING NORTH OP SAI DTPENCED LWE^ INCLUDING THE 
DWELLtN6;]H0USE THEREON* . AT. THAT TJME P L ^ 
A D1SCREPENCY QEWSSfel faEv F E N ^ -;',:, 
^'I'AINTttft- ; - HOWEVER PORCrtASED^FROM H A R R I S i l l • M O M ' J E ^ A N f c H I S ^ I ^ ^ r . . • ; 
• f f W U T ^ M A f c l N ^ ^ 
• • .•••;*;:' ,;• :• &'•' ••v :M^i';'<*%&\ :v v: • •.,: MWr: ^ t i ¥ ^ ^ 
\TH&;D!#M^ 
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SCT FORTH IN THS DEED WHICH PLAINTIFFS RECEIVED FROM HARRIS SIMONSCN 
AND HIS WfF«5 NOR CONCERNING THE FACT THAT DEFENDANTS WERE LIVING IN 
THE HOUSE NORTH OF SAID FENCED LINE. 
10, THE LAND LYING NORTH OF SAID FENCED DIVISION LINE IS 
IN CARBON COUNTY, UTAH AND IS PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT 5W FEET NORTH OF 
THE WEST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 5, 
TOWNSHIP 13 SOUTH, RANGE 7 EAST OF THE 
SALT LAKE MERIDIAN AND RUNNING THENCE 
NORTH 775 FEET; THENCE EAST 1320 FEET; 
nnnfKKM) THENCE SOUTH 105 3 FEET; THENCE NORTH 
78 DEGREES 2G MINUTES WEST 133*» FEET 
MORE OR LH^n TO THr ra iHT or ngftfNNINft* 
U , THE LAND LYING SOUTH OF SAID FENCED DIVISION LINC 
IS IN CARBON COUNTY, UTAH AND IS PARTICULARLY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
BEGINNING AT A POINT $W FEET NORTH OF 
THE WEST QUARTER CORNER OF SECTION 5 , 
TOWNSHIP 13 SOUTH, RANGE 7 EAST OF THE 
SALT LAKE MERIDIAN AND RUNNING THENCE 
SOUTH 5W FEET; THENCE EAST 1320 FEET; 
THENCE NORTH 26 7 FEET; THENCE NORTH 
78 DEGREES 20 MINUTES WEST I33'» FEET 
MORE OR LESS TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING, 
12, A FENCED RIGHT OF WAY EXISTS AND HAS EXISTED FOR 
MANY YEARS ACROSS THE NORTH PARCEL WHICH SERVES BOTH PARCELS FOR 
ENTRY AND EXIT, 
CONCLUSIONS, OF LAW 
AS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT 
THE COURT DECIDES! 
1 . AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS, PLAINTITFS ARE NOT BONA FIDE 
PURCHASERS FOR VALU5 OF THE LANCS DESCRIBED IN THEIR COMPLAINT WHICH 
LIE NORTH OF SAID FENCED DIVISION LINE. 
2 , DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE DECREE OF THE COURT 
QUIETING THEIR TITLE TO THE LAND DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 10 OF THBSB 
FINDINGS OF FACT AGAINST PLAINTIFFS AND ALL PERSONS CLAIMING BY, 
THROUGH OR UNDER THEM SUHUECT, HOWEVER, TO THE RIGHT IN PLAINTIFFS 
TO USE THE SAID FENCED RIGHT OF WAY IN COMMON WITH DEFENDANTS TO 
S8RV8 THEIR SAID PARCEL. 
n * * ^ 
!« flLAUITlPPS * W ©NITITUO TO IMC DeC&K Of TMC COURT 
QUIflTMG r-HEIHt TITUS TO VW UWfO GSSCMftCO IM PAMOMPMi t | AGAINST 
DC PENT)ANTS AtHO AIL PERSON* CUMMINH3 1ST, TWI*OlfcNI Oil WW5R THEM, 
*« UraNMMINIS M « ©KTIHEO TO COSTS, 
MMf 1MIS SATO M T OF %WMWWWf# 19S9. 
i f e p a ^ 
ft|*Tft!?v <JtWH 
iA'« McnveiTcflpr or !|wiBc«^ini«d& r OP* ran; AND CONCLUSIONS or 
tMTllHHIS'JlST ntt^OP tMMUftMT, 1 J * , * I T , . 
~$K?*V^ ATTOlMfflrflBft PLAINTIFFS 
fliJIi/Jifi 
